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We discuss the Ping-Pong protocol which was proposed by Bostro¨m and Felbinger. We derive
a simple trade-off inequality between distinguishability of messages for Eve and detectability of
Eve for legitimate users. Our inequality holds for arbitrary initial states. That is, even if Eve
prepares an initial state, she cannot distinguish messages without being detected. We show that
the same inequality holds also on another protocol in which Alice and Bob use one-way quantum
communication channel twice.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2002, Bostro¨m and Felbinger [1] proposed a quantum protocol which is called Ping-Pong protocol. Being different
from other protocols such as BB84 or E91, this protocol uses two-way quantum communication. They showed a trade-
off inequality between information gain by Eve and the error probability detected by Alice and Bob on the ideal setting
of the protocol. That is, information gain by Eve is inevitably detected by Alice and Bob. While they insist that
this protocol works as a secure direct communication as well as a key distribution protocol, there have been several
discussions on its security from various points of view [2, 3, 4, 5]. The purpose of the present paper is not to discuss the
security issue of the protocol but to give a simple derivation of another trade-off inequality between distinguishability
of messages for Eve and detectability of Eve for legitimate users. The inequality holds for arbitrary initial states.
Thus even if an initial state is prepared by Eve, she cannot distinguish the messages without being detected. As
a byproduct, we show that the same inequality holds on a variant of the original protocol in which Bob sends his
quantum system twice to Alice.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we give a short description of the original Ping-Pong
protocol. In section III, a trade-off inequality is derived in a simple manner. In section IV, a variant of the original
protocol is given. It is shown that our trade-off inequality still holds on this variant.
II. PROTOCOL
In this section we give a brief explanation on the simplest version of the protocols for Alice to send Bob one-bit
message (or secret key). Bob first prepares a maximally entangled state |φ0〉 :=
1√
2
(|11〉 + |00〉). He sends one
of the bipartite systems which is called system A. It is described by a Hilbert space HA(≃ C
2). Another system
possessed by Bob is called system B with its Hilbert space HB(≃ C
2). Bob confirms Alice’s receipt of the system
A [6]. Alice randomly chooses one from {Control, Message}. If she chose “Control”, she lets Bob know it and they
both make measurements of σz(A) and σz(B) on their own systems respectively [7]. If their outcomes disagree, they
know existence of Eve and abort the protocol. On the other hand, if Alice chose “Message”, she encodes her one-bit
message to her system A. She does nothing on system A for the message 0. She operates σz(A) on it for the message
1, which changes the phase with respect to |0〉. Alice sends back the system A to Bob. Bob makes a Bell measurement
on the composite system A and B to know the encoded message. As pointed out in [2, 5], this naive protocol yields
a simple “attack” that disturbs the message without being detected. That is, just an attack only on the second
quantum communication from Alice to Bob does not affect the error probability in the control mode but can change
the message while Eve cannot obtain any information. As claimed in [2, 5], this disadvantage may be avoided by
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2introducing authentication phase after the protocol or slightly modifying the protocol itself. We, however, do not
treat this problem here. What we are interested in is whether Eve can distinguish the messages 0 and 1 without being
detected.
III. ANALYSIS
Let us see what Eve can do in this protocol. Eve prepares her own system E which is described by a Hilbert space
HE . We write the initial state of system E as |Ω〉. She interacts it with system A when system A is sent between Alice
and Bob. That is, she has two chances to obtain the information. Let us denote the first interaction by a unitary map
W : HA ⊗HE → HA ⊗HE and the second interaction by V : HA ⊗HE → HA ⊗HE . The state after the first attack
is described by |Ψ〉 := W |φ ⊗ Ω〉. The final state over the tripartite system A, B and E in a message mode becomes
V |Ψ〉 when Alice’s message is 0 and becomes V σz(A)|Ψ〉 when Alice’s message is 1. Eve’s purpose is to distinguish
them. The states to be distinguished by Eve are
ρ0 := trAB (V |Ψ〉〈Ψ|V
∗)
ρ1 := trAB (V σz(A)|Ψ〉〈Ψ|σz(A)V
∗) .
We employ fidelity [8, 9] as a measure for (in)distinguishability of states. The fidelity between two states ρ and σ is
defined by F (ρ, σ) := tr
√
ρ1/2σρ1/2. It takes 1 if and only if ρ = σ and takes a nonnegative value less than 1 in general.
The key lemma is the following which played an important role in [10] to derive a version of Wigner-Araki-Yanase
theorem.
Lemma 1 Suppose that we have two systems that are described by Hilbert spaces H1 and H2, and a pair of pure states
|φ0〉, |φ1〉 ∈ H1 ⊗H2. If we put states on H2 as
ρj := tr1 (|φj〉〈φj |) ,
for j = 0, 1, then for an arbitrary operator X on H1,
|〈φ0|X |φ1〉| ≤ ‖X‖F (ρ0, ρ1)
holds, where ‖ · ‖ is an operator norm defined by ‖X‖ := sup|φ〉6=0
‖X|φ〉‖
‖|φ〉‖ .
Proof:
We consider an arbitrary positive-operator-valued measure (POVM) {Eα} on H2, that is, every positive operator Eα
acts only on H2 and satisfies
∑
αEα = 1. We obtain
|〈φ0|X |φ1〉| = |
∑
α
〈φ0|EαX |φ1〉| = |
∑
α
〈φ0|E
1/2
α XE
1/2
α |φ1〉|,
where we used the commutativity between E
1/2
α and X . We further obtain
|〈φ0|X |φ1〉| ≤
∑
α
|〈φ0|E
1/2
α XE
1/2
α |φ1〉|
≤
∑
α
〈φ0|Eα|φ0〉
1/2〈φ1|E
1/2
α X
∗XE1/2α |φ1〉
1/2
≤
∑
α
〈φ0|Eα|φ0〉
1/2〈φ1|Eα|φ1〉
1/2‖X‖,
where we used the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality to derive the second line and the definition of the operator norm to
derive the third line. By using a property F (ρ, σ) = infE:POVM
∑
α
√
tr(ρEα)tr(σEα) which was shown in [11, 12],
we take the infimum of the above inequality over all the POVMs to obtain
|〈φ0|X |φ1〉| ≤ ‖X‖F (ρ0, ρ1).
It ends the proof. Q.E.D.
In applying this lemma to Wigner-Araki-Yanase theorem, it was important to have a conserved quantity. Also
in the Ping-Pong protocol, we have a conserved quantity. In fact, since the system B is kept by Bob during whole
3the protocol, the attack does not give any effect on the operator on system B. That is, for any operator X on HB,
W ∗V ∗XVW = X and V ∗XV = X hold. We take the second equation and operate 〈Ψ| and σz(A)|Ψ〉 to it. We obtain
〈Ψ|V ∗XV σz(A)|Ψ〉 = 〈Ψ|Xσz(A)|Ψ〉.
Taking the absolute value of the above equation, we apply the lemma with H1 = HA ⊗HB, H2 = HE , |φ0〉 = V |Ψ〉
and |φ1〉 = V σz(A)|Ψ〉 to obtain,
‖X‖F (ρ0, ρ1) ≥ |〈Ψ|Xσz(A)|Ψ〉|.
Thus the indistinguishability of the messages for Eve is bounded from below by a correlation function after the first
attack. If we put X = σz(B), this correlation function becomes
〈Ψ|σz(B)σz(A)|Ψ〉 = p(0, 0) + p(1, 1)− p(0, 1)− p(1, 0) = 1− 2p(σz(A) 6= σz(B)),
where p(i, j) is probability for Alice and Bob to obtain σz(A) = i and σz(B) = j respectively in |Ψ〉. That is, this is
a probability distribution of the outcomes in the control mode. Thus we obtain
|1− 2p(σz(A) 6= σz(B))| ≤ F (ρ0, ρ1).
Note that this inequality holds for an arbitrary state |Ψ〉 over the tripartite state since we did not use its concrete
form. Thus we proved the following theorem.
Theorem 1 In the Ping-Pong protocol, Eve cannot distinguish the messages 0 and 1 without being detected. In
fact, if we put p(σz(A) 6= σz(B)) probability for Alice and Bob to obtain different outcomes in the control mode,
indistinguishability measured by the fidelity is bounded as
|1− 2p(σz(A) 6= σz(B))| ≤ F (ρ0, ρ1).
Here the initial state can be arbitrary. Even if it was prepared by Eve, the above trade-off inequality still holds.
It should be remarked that although the above trade-off inequality holds for arbitrarily prepared states, it does not
mean that the protocol works in such cases. In fact, in such cases Alice and Bob cannot share the messages even if
they do not detect Eve. That is, success in message sharing and information gain by Eve are different matters in this
protocol.
IV. A VARIANT OF THE PROTOCOL
In the original Ping-Pong protocol Bob first sends a qubit to Alice and receives it in the end of the protocol. In
this section, we consider its variant. After the confirmation of Alice’s receipt of a qubit, Bob, instead of Alice, sends a
message to Alice. For the definiteness, we describe the whole protocol in the following. Bob first prepares a maximally
entangled state |φ0〉 :=
1√
2
(|11〉+ |00〉). He sends one of the bipartite systems which is called system A. It is described
by a Hilbert space HA. Another system possessed by Bob is called system B with its Hilbert space HB. Bob confirms
Alice’s receipt of the system A. Bob randomly chooses one from {Control, Message}. If he chose “Control”, he lets
Alice know it and they both make measurements of σz(A) and σz(B) on their own systems respectively. If their
outcomes disagree, they know existence of Eve and abort the protocol. On the other hand, if Bob chose “Message”,
he encodes his one-bit message to his system B. He does nothing on system B for the message 0. He operates σz(B)
on it for the message 1, which changes the phase with respect to |0〉. Bob sends the system B to Alice. Alice makes
a Bell measurement to the composite system A and B to know the encoded message.
We can prove again the following theorem.
Theorem 2 In the above variant of the Ping-Pong protocol, Eve cannot distinguish the message 0 and 1 without
being detected. Let us denote by µ0 Eve’s final state corresponding to the message 0 and µ1 one corresponding to the
message 1. If we put p(σz(A) 6= σz(B)) probability for Alice and Bob to obtain different outcomes in the control mode,
indistinguishability between µ0 and µ1 is bounded as
|1− 2p(σz(A) 6= σz(B))| ≤ F (µ0, µ1).
Here the initial state can be arbitrary. Even if it was prepared by Eve, the above trade-off inequality still holds.
4Proof:
The proof runs in the same manner with the previous theorem. Eve, with her own system E, interacts system A
and system B when they are sent from Bob to Alice. We denote by |Ψ〉 the state over system A, B and E after the
first attack and denote the second attack by a unitary map U : HB ⊗ HE → HB ⊗ HE . In the message mode, the
states Eve wants to distinguish are µ0 := trAB(U |Ψ〉〈Ψ|U
∗) and µ1 := trAB(Uσz(B)|Ψ〉〈Ψ|σz(B)U∗) Since the second
attack does not change the operator on HA, U
∗σz(A)U = σz(A) holds. We operate 〈Ψ| · σz(A)|Ψ〉 on this equation
to obtain,
〈Ψ|U∗σz(A)Uσz(B)|Ψ〉 = 〈Ψ|σz(A)σz(B)|Ψ〉.
Applying Lemma 1 to the absolute value of the left hand side withH1 = HA⊗HB, H2 = HE , X = σz(A), |φ0〉 = U |Ψ〉
and |φ1〉 = Uσz(B)|Ψ〉, we obtain,
|1− 2p(σz(A) 6= σz(B))| ≤ F (µ0, µ1).
It ends the proof. Q.E.D.
V. DISCUSSIONS
In this paper, we treated the Ping-Pong protocol and derived a trade-off inequality between distinguishability of
states for Eve and detectability for legitimate users. The inequality holds for arbitrary states that may be prepared
even by Eve. We showed that the same inequality holds in a slightly different protocol in which the quantum
communication is one-way. It, however, should be remarked that this trade-off relation does not directly mean the
security of the protocols. For instance, Eve can change the message without being detected by making an attack
only on the second communication phase. Furthermore, if Alice and Bob intend to use the protocols for direct
communication, they need to confirm sufficiently many times the cleanness of the line before sending a message. In
fact, otherwise Eve may obtain the message with non-negligible probability. Thus further investigation on definition
and analysis of the security should be needed.
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